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ALLOCATING RESOURCES AMONG PRISONS
AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS IN THE
BATTLE AGAINST CRIME
JOHN J. DONOHUE I1 and PETER SIEGELMAN*
ABSTRACT
This article evaluates the cost and crime-reducing potential of prisons and social
spending, setting forth the conditions under which a shift in resources from an ex-
panding prison population into social spending would lead to a reduction in total
crime. Preschool enrichment programs coupled with family intervention have gen-
erated impressive results in reducing crime in a number of different studies. Tar-
geting of resources toward those children most at risk of criminal behavior is neces-
sary to generate cost-effective crime reduction, but this may be difficult to achieve
because of political or constitutional constraints. Given precise targeting, and if a
broadly implemented preschool program (more enriched than the current Head Start
program) could generate half the crime-reduction benefits achieved in the pilot stud-
ies, then cutting spending on prisons and using the savings to fund intensive pre-
school education would reduce crime. The elasticity of crime with respect to incar-
ceration is taken to be .15.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS article provides a large-scale overview of governmental crime-
fighting expenditures and asks whether society is allocating these resources
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in an optimal way across two important crime-reducing "technologies":
prisons and social programs. Unless the government spends in such a way
that the marginal benefit (the crime reduction achieved from the last dollar
spent) is the same for each activity, society will not be fighting crime in a
cost-effective manner. In such cases, reallocating resources toward higher-
payoff approaches will lower crime for any given level of expenditure.'
The goal of this article, then, is to provide a rough empirical assessment
of whether our current policy of increasing reliance on incarceration and de-
clining use of social spending is the best way to spend our crime-reduction
dollars. To do this, we begin in Section II by assessing incarceration as a
crime control strategy, demonstrating that the effects on crime of further
increases in the number of prisoners are likely to be modest, especially
given the substantial run-up in the prison population over the past 3 de-
cades. Section III looks at several different kinds of social programs that
are alleged to reduce criminal behavior. While the evidence is far from per-
fect, we do find several programs that appear to generate substantial reduc-
tions in crime at reasonable cost. Finally, Section IV explicitly considers
the implications of shifting expenditures away from the massive increases
being channeled into prison construction and incarceration to some of the
successful social programs. We describe the conditions under which it
would be possible to reduce spending on prisons, use the money to fund
social programs, and reduce the overall crime rate in the process.
It may be helpful to provide a summary of our major conclusions. If the
implicit assumption of every study of which we are aware is correct that
the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration is constant, then each
subsequent increase in the prison population will cost increasingly more to
generate the same percentage reduction in crime. In our earlier work, we
demonstrated that given an elasticity of crime in the neighborhood of 10-
20 percent, past increases in incarceration were cost beneficial, but future
increases were increasingly more problematic. For example, a doubling of
the current prison population-which would entail an additional social cost
of roughly $36 billion per year-- would likely decrease crime by only about
10-20 percent. While many social programs have been ineffective, there is
evidence that early childhood intervention-of a more costly and more val-
uable kind than is currently offered by Head Start-can reduce future crim-
A longer version of this article (John J. Donohue Ill and Peter Siegelman, Is the United
States at the Optimal Rate of Crime? Allocating Resources among Prisons, Police, and So-
cial Programs (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University and the American Bar Founda-
tion, 1996)) contains an extended discussion of the costs of crime; with estimates of these
costs, we are able to say something about whether the total spending on crime-control is
roughly optimal. Here, we ignore the question of the total volume of spending and focus only
on the allocation of crime-fighting expenditures between prisons and social programs.
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inality. The crucial question is whether we could replicate the most success-
ful preschool interventions on a large scale without reducing their
effectiveness by more than 50 percent. If so, and if we can target such pre-
school spending on the most crime-prone individuals (low-income, inner-
city males), and if the reductions in criminal conduct of program partici-
pants are not offset by increased criminal behavior by nonparticipants, we
argue that diverting resources from continuing large increases in incarcera-
tion and directing the social savings to preschool interventions could reduce
crime without increasing spending.
It is likely that a full assessment of both the other benefits that flow from
social programs and the social costs of enforcing criminal law through a
punitive system would strengthen the case for stopping further prison
expansion. The factual predicates of the value of enriched preschool pro-
grams should quickly be explored through expanded experimental programs
whose results are carefully analyzed. Finally, a more precise estimate of the
elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration would be a significant aid
in wise policy making since high-end estimates suggest a greater scope for
further prison population increases and more moderate or low-end estimates
suggest that further prison growth should be curtailed with the saved re-
sources channeled to social programs.
II. INCARCERATION
Over the last 2 decades, the United States has tipped strongly toward in-
carceration as the major crime-fighting strategy, resulting in a prison popu-
lation that is both unprecedentedly large and rapidly growing. As of De-
cember 1993, the United States was incarcerating about 925,000 individuals
in state and federal prisons, a rate of over 300 per 100,000 Americans. To-
day, the prison population is well over 1 million. This level of incarceration
is unprecedented in this country's history and throughout the world today.
Moreover, these figures do not include the more than 500,000 who are cur-
rently in jail or in juvenile detention facilities.
As Figure 1 reveals, the rate of incarceration in the United States varied
within a narrow band of roughly 100-120 prisoners per 100,000 total popu-
lation between 1933 and 1973. Since 1974, however, the incarceration rate
has risen dramatically, with no evidence of any slowdown. The current rate
of growth requires the equivalent of almost two new 1,000-inmate prisons
to open every week.
A. The Costs of Incarceration
A number of studies have tried to estimate the cost of keeping a con-
victed criminal in prison for a year. They have typically evaluated the an-
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nual custodial costs of housing, clothing, and supervising an inmate, the
amortized cost of constructing the prison cell, and the attendant social costs
of incarceration, such as the lost legitimate production and the increased
welfare dependency of the families of inmates. Based on this approach,
these studies have estimated the annual cost of locking up an inmate (in
1993 dollars) to be $25,000,2 $32,000, 3 and $45,000.4 The latter figure,
which comes from the BOTEC report,5 is the most carefully constructed
and comprehensive; we adjust it in two ways to generate our own estimate.
First, 20 percent of the BOTEC report's cost of incarceration comes from
the estimated increase in "welfare costs to [support] inmate's dependents,"
which we omit since the increased welfare payments are not a social cost
but a transfer from taxpayers to welfare recipients.6 Second, we believe that
the BOTEC report exaggerates the amortized construction cost of a prison
cell.7 Our resulting estimate of the annual cost of incarcerating an additional
inmate is about $36,000 (in 1993 dollars), which includes the cost of build-
ing and occupying a prison cell, plus the lost legitimate wages of the occu-
pant.
Other factors are also relevant to assessing the cost of incarceration. Im-
2 John J. Dilulio, Jr., and Anne M. Piehl, Does Prison Pay? 9 Brookings Rev 28 (1991);
Anne M. Piehl and John J. Dilulio, Jr., "Does Prison Pay?" Revisited, 13 Brookings Rev
20 (1995).
' Edwin Zedlewski, Making Confinement Decisions, Natl Inst Just, Res Brief 2 (July
1987).
4 David Cavanagh and Mark Kleiman, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Prison Cell Construction
and Alternative Sanctions (report prepared for the National Institute of Justice under contract
OJP-90-M-141, June 20, 1990) (hereafter, the BOTEC report).
s Id at 13.
6 Note that raising revenues through distortionary taxes to pay the welfare expenses will
involve a social cost, but this cost is measured by the deadweight loss imposed by the taxes,
rather than the size of the welfare payments themselves. This same deadweight loss exists
whenever taxes are used to pay for any public expenditures-including those on prisons,
police, and public education.
Even if one wanted to include the higher welfare expenditures as a cost of incarceration,
the BOTEC report overestimates this expense. Cavanagh and Kleiman estimate that the com-
bined annual cost of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food Stamp, and
Medicaid payments equals $19,554 (in 1989 dollars). Id at 16. Noting that 43 percent of the
prison inmates have dependents, they estimate the per-inmate welfare cost to be 43 percent
of the $19,554. But surely many of these dependents would be on welfare even if the prisoner
were not incarcerated, and it is only the marginal cost that would be relevant. We should
note that BOTEC report was in all likelihood being generous in its assessment of the cost of
prisons, which would have been a conservative approach given its conclusion that the bene-
fits of incarceration far exceeded the costs.
7 The BOTEC report uses a nominal interest rate in computing the annualized cost at
$4,094 (in 1989 dollars) per. cell. We simply take their estimated construction cost and com-
pute the equivalent annual cost using a 4.5 percent real discount rate, which equals $2,982
(in 1993 dollars).
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prisonment may impose costs on the inmate's family-the loss of the com-
pany of a parent or spouse and any attendant costs to those families invol-
untarily thrust on welfare. Indeed, one might even argue that the disutility
to the prisoner himself is a social cost, although for some crimes, the public
may feel positive benefits from this disutility.
Incarceration imposes social costs if time in prison impairs the productiv-
ity of prisoners after their release8 or prevents the accumulation of legiti-
mate job experience.9
While we think it likely that these social costs exceed the social benefits
we have omitted-the public's benefit from seeing an individual punished
plus the value of prison inmate production-we do not augment our esti-
mated cost of incarceration because their appropriate magnitude is uncer-
tain, and we choose to be conservative in making our calculations. In the
next section, we turn to the question of how much crime reduction we could
secure by spending $36,000 per year to incarcerate another criminal.
B. How Much Crime Does Incarceration Prevent?
Many policy analysts have trumpeted the benefits of incarceration as a
crime-control strategy. The titles of recent articles- "Doubling the Prison
Population Will Break America's Crime Wave," 10 and "Prisons Are a Bar-
gain, by Any Measure" -reflect this common viewpoint.1" These senti-
ments have garnered the support of many citizens and politicians, as evi-
' Robert Sampson and John Laub have found that juveniles who are sentenced to prison
do less well than otherwise-similar juveniles who are not. They conclude that "imprisonment
may have powerful negative effects on the prospects of future employment and job stabil-
ity." Robert Sampson and John Laub, Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points
through Life 255 (1993).
There is a growing empirical literature in economics about the effect of conviction on fu-
ture earnings. See Daniel Nagin and Joel Waldfogel, The Effects of Criminality and Convic-
tion on the Labor Market Status of Young British Offenders, 15 Intematl Rev L & Econ 109
(1995); Daniel Nagin and Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Conviction on Income through the
Life Cycle (Working Paper No 4551, National Bureau of Economic Research 1993); Jeffrey
Grogger, Arrests, Persistent Youth Joblessness, and Black/White Employment Differentials,
74 Rev Econ & Statistics 100 (1992); Ann Witte and Pamela Reid, An Exploration of the
Determinants of Labor Market Performance of Prison Releasees, 56 J Urban Econ 313 (Au-
gust 1980).
9 As we discuss in the longer version of this article (cited in note 1), the present discounted
value of the cost of a year of lost experience could be as high as $10,000 (in 1993 dollars)
if prisoners would have worked continuously in legitimate jobs had they not been incarcer-
ated and would they work continuously on release. Of course, such continuous legitimate
work experience would be unusual for many inmates.
" Eugene Methvin, Doubling the Prison Population Will Break America's Crime Wave,
Corrections Today 28 (February 1992).
" John Dilulio, Prisons Are a Bargain, by Any Measure, NY Times A19 (January 16,
1996).
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denced by the rapidly growing prison population and the nationwide effort
to enact "Three Strikes and You're Out" laws.
Two approaches have been used to estimate the crime-reducing effects
of incarceration. The first focuses exclusively on the amount of crime that
is avoided through the incapacitative effects of incarceration. The idea un-
derlying this line of research is simply that by removing a convicted crimi-
nal from society and placing him in prison, we can eliminate the crimes he
would have otherwise committed. Although the insight seems commonsen-
sical, empirical estimation turns out to be trickier than one might imagine
and requires some sophisticated statistical modeling.12 The second approach
tries to estimate the total crime reduction associated with increased incar-
ceration without distinguishing between incapacitation and deterrence ef-
fects. Using aggregate (usually state-level) data, these studies in essence
test the proposition that higher imprisonment rates are associated with
lower rates of crime, while controlling for other factors. We discuss each
of these two approaches in turn.
1. Pure Incapacitation Effects
Incapacitation as a solution to the crime problem has a certain intuitive
appeal. One thing we clearly know how to do is build prisons and house
people in them. If nothing else, criminals who are in prison cannot commit
any crimes against the rest of society. Unlike social programs, the "technol-
ogy" of incarceration is well proven, begins to work immediately in reduc-
ing crime, and requires little except money to accomplish its primary
goal-keeping convicted criminals off the streets. But while incarceration
may be a low-risk strategy of fighting crime, it is not inexpensive: one
needs to prevent a lot of crime to justify the roughly $36 million it costs to
lock up an extra 1,000 prisoners. Unfortunately, close examination suggests
that the incapacitative effect of prison is much less powerful than one might
at first imagine.
We begin exploring the effects of incapacitation by looking at only one
2 The pioneers in the statistical modeling of incarceration-using techniques derived from
'the queuing theory literature in operations research-were B. Avi-Itzhak and R. Shinnar,
Quantitative Models in Crime Control, 1 J Crim Just 185 (1973); and R. Shinnar and S.
Shinnar, The Effect of the Criminal Justice System on the Control of Crime: A Quantitative
Approach, 9 L & Socy Rev 581 (1975). We focus on the more recent efforts of Jacqueline
Cohen and Jose A. Canela-Cacho, Incarceration and Violent Crime: 1965-1988, in Albert
J. Reiss, Jr., and Jeffrey A. Roth, eds, Understanding and Preventing Violence, Vol 4: Conse-
quences and Control (1994); and especially William Spelman, Criminal Incapacitation
(1994).
Zedlewski (cited in note 3) and the BOTEC report (cited in note 4) estimate incarceration
effects using a framework that drastically overstates the benefits of incapacitative effects of
prisons, as we argue below.
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF THE PROPORTION OF ALL ROBBERIES
PREVENTED BY THE CURRENT PRISON POPULATION,
DUE TO INCAPACITATION ALONE
Incapacitation Effect
Study (in Percent)*
Avi-Itzhak and Shinnart 4.7-7.8
BOTEC (low)t 11
Spelman§ 21
Cohen and Canela-Cacholl 28-41
Zedlewskit 107
BOTEC (high): 174
NOTE.-Sources can be found in indicated article notes.
* This is the percentage increase in the number of robberies if
(a) the current population of prisoners were set free, without re-
placing them, and (b) there were no behavioral response by anyone
to the new (zero) risk of incarceration. See text for further details.
t Cited in note 12. The range covers estimates for Texas, Cali-
fornia, and Michigan. Calculated by Cohen and Canela-Cacho, p.
331 (cited in note 12).
* The BOTEC (cited in note 4) and Zedlewski (cited in note 3)
estimates were derived by taking
(no. of persons in prison) . c
(no. of robberies)
where c is the author's estimate of the number of robberies pre-
vented by imprisoning one robber for 1 year. We use 104,700 as
the number of imprisoned robbers in 1991 (U.S. Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook, 1993, table 6.41)
and 1,203,000 as the number of robberies (table 3.2). The number
of robberies is measured from the National Crime Victimization
Survey.
§ Cited in note 12, p. 217. Spelman calculates that there is a 90
percent probability that the true value is between 15 and 28 per-
cent. The estimate is for all crimes, not robbery taken separately.
II Cited in note 12, pp. 330-31.
crime-robbery. Table 1 presents a range of estimates for the "pure" inca-
pacitative effect of prison on the number of robberies. Conceptually, it mea-
sures the increase in the number of robberies that would result if the current
population of prisoners were set free. 3 The table gives a sense of the ex-
tremely large range of estimates for the incapacitative effects of the prison
system: the lowest estimate is that current incapacitation alone prevents
only a 5 percent increase in robberies, while the highest estimate suggests
3 This calculation is made assuming that the freed prisoners are not replaced by any new
arrestees and that actual or potential criminals would not alter their behavior in response to
the lower (zero) risk of incarceration. Both of these counterfactuals are, of course, wildly
implausible, but they are useful in comparing the various (upper-bound) estimates of the ef-
fects of incarceration on crime.
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that robberies would rise by almost 175 percent if the current prisoner pop-
ulation were freed.
These estimates are all derived from a roughly similar family of statisti-
cal models, although with widely varying degrees of complexity and so-
phistication.14 The most important variables in these models are
-the distribution of X, the number of crimes committed per criminal per
year-both for criminals in the overall population and among
those in prison;
-the distribution of career length (number of years over which a crimi-
nal is active, when not in prison); and
-the probability of arrest (and conviction), which may vary with X.
This family of models suffers from four potentially important problems
that can exaggerate the estimated effectiveness of incapacitation.
1. Distortions in Self-Reports of Crime. One drawback faced by all
these models is that they require data that can only be obtained by asking
prisoners how many crimes they have committed. Yet the prisoners may
well either exaggerate or understate the extent of their criminal behavior,
which cannot be ascertained since there are no independent sources against
which their reports can be checked. Self-reports of arrests, however, can be
checked against official records: such checks generally reveal that "[t]he
self-reports of most offenders squared with their official records, with few
or no disparities."' 5 But for those offenders who do not report accurately,
the disparities between actual and self-reported arrests are not random. In-
stead, "offenders with few arrests systematically underestimate the number
of times they are arrested... [while those] with many arrests systematically
overestimate." 16
William Spelman devotes considerable attention to the problems caused
by biases in self-report data and proposes several solutions. Without such
corrections, he notes, the use of raw self-report data makes incapacitation
look more effective than it actually is.' 7 Several of the other studies do not
correct for reporting biases or make only crude attempts to do so.
" The Zedlewski and BOTEC estimates are based largely on simple extrapolation, while
Spelman (cited in note 12) and Cohen and Canela-Cacho (cited in note 12), are substantially
more rigorous and nuanced.
"5 Spelman, at 47-48 (cited in note 12).
16 Id at 53.
"7 The net effect of the biases is to increase the mean, variance, and skewness of the of-
fense rate (?) distribution. This in turn means that the average prisoner will appear to be
committing more crimes (if free) than he actually would; it also means that the most crime-
prone prisoners appear to be responsible for a greater share of all crime than they actually
are.
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In addition to the problems with self-reports, many of the incapacitation
models-such as those of Edwin Zedlewski and the BOTEC report-also
fail to address a number of important issues. These include:
2. Distinguishing between Stocks and Flows. One method of calculat-
ing the effect of incarceration is to ask what would happen if we took the
group of prisoners who were scheduled to be released and, instead of letting
them out of prison, built enough new cells to keep them incarcerated for
another year. A common error among researchers who employ this ap-
proach is to assume (implicitly) that those released from prison in any year
are a random sample of all prisoners, when they in fact tend to be the less
serious criminals. 8 The problem stems from the failure to distinguish be-
tween the average number of crimes committed by the total stock of prison-
ers and the mean criminality of the group of prisoners who are poised to
leave prison (the annual flow of releasees). When the prison population has
been growing rapidly, however, there is likely to be a large difference be-
tween the composition of the stock and the flow. In particular, criminals
with shorter-than-average sentences will be overrepresented among those
who leave prison in any given year. If there is a positive correlation
between sentence length and prior record, as seems likely, then the cohort
of released prisoners will tend to have lower than average Xs as well.
Thus, the crimes prevented by keeping the current group of released pris-
oners incarcerated for an additional year will tend to be less than the aver-
age number of crimes committed by all prisoners-and probably dramati-
cally so.
3. Distinguishing between Marginal and Average Criminality. It is
well known that those in prison tend to have substantially higher Xs than
the "active criminal population" as a whole. 9 The main reason for this di-
vergence is that criminals who commit more crimes per year put themselves
8 For example, the BOTEC report argues that, "[i]f one thousand additional cells are
built, and are used to extend the prison terms of one thousand current inmates by 1 year, and
if these prisoners are selected at random from the current prison population, then by the law
of large numbers (the Central Limit Theorem of statistics) those inmates' annual rate of com-
mitting crimes before entering prisons will be the same as the average annual rate of all
current prisoners. The net incapacitation effect will be as if each one of the thousand cells
held a prisoner with the average annual crime commission rate of current prisoners." Id at
21, emphasis in original. But note that such an extension of sentences will mean those sen-
tenced to get out in 50 years will experience added incapacitation in a half-century, while
those who were scheduled for release after a short sentence will be incapacitated further to-
day. The latter group tends to have far lower crime commission rates.
"9 By failing to account for this problem, Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar (cited in note 12) under-
state the amount of crime prevented by incarceration. (See Table 1.) Cohen and Canela-
Cacho, at 331 (cited in note 12).
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at a higher annual risk of arrest.2" The consequence of this "self-selection"
that puts the most-frequent criminals behind bars is that, other things being
equal, expanding the prison population will increasingly bring in criminals
with progressively lower Xs.21 If, instead of keeping the current cohort of
releasees in prison for an additional year, we bring in enough new prisoners
to both replace the outflow and add to the total number behind bars, the
new group is likely to be substantially less crime-prone than the average
among all prisoners. Accordingly, estimates of the incapacitation effect,
such as those of Zedlewski and the BOTEC report that are based on keep-
ing the current prison population imprisoned for a longer period, overstate
the benefits from simply locking up more criminals.
4. Replacement Effects. Zedlewski and the BOTEC report both assume
that incarcerating a prisoner for an additional year will reduce crime by the
number of crimes that the prisoner committed in the year prior to his incar-
ceration. This may be plausible for some crimes but is certainly not true for
others. For example, locking up a husband who batters his wife will proba-
bly reduce the beatings she will receive in the next year by the number he
would inflict if he were free.
But much crime is not of this character. If, to use Zedlewski's figure, the
average prisoner stole 51 cars in the year immediately prior to his incarcera-
tion, then his incapacitation is unlikely to reduce the number of auto thefts
by 51. Many crimes are committed by criminal rings or gangs; under these
circumstances, the loss of one gang member will probably just lead to the
recruitment of another. If the replacement thief is less talented or energetic
than his predecessor, crime may fall-but one cannot simply assume that
the decrease will be equal to the full 51 thefts.22 Better estimates of the inca-
pacitative effect of imprisonment, such as Spelman's, use crime-specific ad-
justments for the replacement effect.
5. Career Lengths. It is widely recognized that most criminals do not
20 There is one caveat:. if the probability of arrest is strongly negatively related to X-
perhaps because more experienced criminals learn to outwit the police-then the worst (high-
est X) criminals might not actually wind up in prison. Both Spelman and Cohen and Canela-
Cacho explicitly reject this possibility on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
2 This point was made tellingly by Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins in their critique
of Zedlewski: The New Mathematics of Imprisonment, 34 Crime & Delinquency 425, 431-
32 (1988). More mathematical discussions can also be found in Spelman and Cohen and
Canela-Cacho.
' The BOTEC report acknowledges that using average crime rates may inflate incapacita-
tion benefits, and Cavanagh and Kleiman adjust for "co-offending and replacement effects
by [reducing the average crimes per inmate] figures by 0.3." Cavanagh and Kleiman, at 22
(cited in note 4). But even after applying this 30 percent downward adjustment, this report's
"high" estimates for the effects of incapacitation are in most cases unrealistically large.
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commit offenses uniformly over their entire adult lifetimes. Instead, crimi-
nal behavior is disproportionately concentrated over a much shorter period,
typically in the late teens and early twenties.23 This fact has obvious impli-
cations for the efficacy of imprisonment as a means of controlling crime.
Consider a 20-year-old who committed 40 crimes in the year prior to re-
ceiving a 10-year sentence. Simply multiplying 40 crimes/year by 10 years
suggests that imprisoning this person would forestall 400 crimes over the
next 10 years. But if the prisoner's criminal career would in any case have
ended at age 25, the true crime reduction is only 200, and 5 years of the
10-year sentence produce no incapacitative benefit."
Only the study by Spelman attempts to fully correct for all of these fac-
tors, and thus, of all the studies of the incapacitative benefits of incarcera-
tion, we place the most confidence in his findings. Spelman's overall con-
clusion is that " [w]e can be 90 percent confident that the true value [of the
elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration] is between .12 and .20,
with a best, single guess of .16."25
2. Direct Estimates of the Benefits of Incarceration
The direct estimates of the benefits of incarceration attempt to determine
the total effect of increased incarceration on crime-whether the benefit
comes from deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation or is partially or
fully reversed by whatever impetus to crime that imprisonment might pro-
vide.
For example, a recently published study by Thomas Marvell and Carlisle
Moody has tried to directly estimate the elasticity of crime with respect to
incarceration by examining crime statistics and prison populations for 49
states over the period 1971-89.26 The paper addresses the problems of si-
multaneity and identification in its econometric specification, while relying
on the flawed FBI data for reported index crimes.2 7 Nonetheless, its conclu-
3 See, for example, A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, J. Roth, and C. Visher, eds, Criminal Careers
and "Career Criminals" (1986).
24 The prospect of a long sentence presumably would have some deterrent effect, but it is
unclear whether sentencing one criminal to 10 years in jail or two criminals to 5 years each
will lead to greater deterrence. If criminals were highly risk-averse, then the former might
dominate, while if they have high discount rates or are risk preferrers, then the latter would
deter more effectively.
2 Spelman, at 220 (cited in note 12).
26 Thomas Marvell and Carlisle Moody, Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction,
10 J Quantitative Criminol 109 (1994).
27 The companion to this article (Donohue and Siegelman; cited in note 1) explores the
problems with the FBI (Uniform Crime Report) data in detail. Briefly, the major failing of
the FBI data is that, owing to the effect of better computerization and recording, it tends to
show increases in crime even when the crime rate is actually falling. If this pattern is uniform
across all states, then the regression estimates of the impact of an increase in the prison popu-
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sion is virtually identical to that of Spelman. According to Marvel and
Moody, "a one percent increase in prison population results in approxi-
mately 0.16 percent fewer reported index crimes," an elasticity of 0.16.2"
Given that Spelman's elasticity estimate of 0.16 was based solely on the
pure incapacitative benefit of incarceration, while Marvel and Moody esti-
mated the total benefit of incarceration (including deterrence), these studies
are not perfectly in agreement-unless there is no deterrent effect to incar-
ceration. Nonetheless, these findings are broadly consistent with the view
of James Q. Wilson that the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration
is between 0.10 and 0.20.29
Although the consensus estimate of the elasticity of crime with respect
to incarceration has been roughly 0.15, recent work by Steven Levitt argues
that the true elasticity may be substantially higher, in the neighborhood of
0.3 or greater.3' The econometric problem in trying to estimate the effect of
incarceration on crime is that, even though more incarceration presumably
lowers crime, more crime tends to increase the amount of incarceration.
Given this simultaneity problem, ordinary least squares regression will tend
to understate the true effects of increased incarceration. Levitt corrects for
this bias by using prison overcrowding litigation in federal courts to iden-
tify the true effect of incarceration on crime. Successful overcrowding law-
suits result in court orders that limit incarceration levels (and thus effect
crime), but by assumption, the amount of crime does not influence prisoner
overcrowding litigation. 3' Levitt's instrumental variables approach thus of-
fers a potential solution to the problem of simultaneity bias: his results sug-
gest that many crimes increase substantially in the aftermath of a court or-
der imposing a cap on the prison population.
Levitt's paper is unusually creative and well constructed. Nevertheless,
his findings raise several questions. First, it is possible that his instrument
(prison overcrowding litigation) is not truly exogenous. Indeed, just as
crime increases prison populations, increased prison populations induce
lation need not be biased. Conceivably, however, the states that most improved their re-
porting, thereby elevating the recorded magnitude of crime, were those most concerned with
the issue of crime, because the rates of crime either were traditionally high or were rising
sharply. These possible links between increased recording of crime and high or rising crime
rates or new get-tough attitudes could bias the estimated effect of increased incarceration in
either direction.
28 Id at 133.
29 James Q. Wilson, Prisons in a Free Society, 117 Pub Interest 37, 38 (Fall 1994).
30 Steven Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from
Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q J Econ 319 (1996).
3' Levitt uses twelve states that have experienced system-wide restraints imposed by fed-
eral courts: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Mississippi, New Mexico, Okla-
homa, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
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more prisoner litigation. Although Levitt tests for this problem, the avail-
able statistical tests are themselves subject to criticism." Second, other at-
tempts to estimate the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration that
use a similar approach-utilizing exogenous limits on prison capacity as an
instrument for incarceration risk-have generated estimates that are much
more in line with the consensus view.33 Finally, some anomalies seem to
exist in the findings. For example, the only two statistically significant
crime-specific elasticities were for robbery (an elasticity of 0.7) and bur-
glary (roughly 0.40). All else being equal, therefore, a 10 percent increase
in incarceration should lead to a 7 percent reduction in robbery and a 4
percent reduction in burglary. If the forces'that generate burglaries and rob-
beries are roughly similar, robberies should therefore fall faster than bur-
glaries during periods when the prison population was rising sharply. But
during a period when the rate of incarceration in the United States tripled
(1973-91), robbery, the crime with the highest elasticity, grew by 5.2 per-
cent, while burglary fell by 19 percent. Moreover, for the crime with the
best available data-murder-Levitt finds that his instrumental variables
estimate is almost identical to the ordinary least squares estimate that the
elasticity with respect to incarceration is roughly .15. Since by a large mar-
gin murder is the most socially costly crime, the overall weighted average
elasticity will be shifted toward .15 even if for other costly crimes the elas-
ticity is greater than .15.
In sum, while Levitt's important work suggests that the elasticity of
crime with respect to incarceration could well be as high as 0.3, our sense
is that this is a high-end estimate. Nonetheless, we explicitly consider a
range of elasticities in our subsequent analysis, so that the effect of the dif-
fering estimates in this one parameter can be clearly identified.
III. CRIME REDUCTION THROUGH SOCIAL PROGRAMS
While it is not easy to classify the numerous social interventions that are
intended to or might in fact reduce crime,' we consider the crime-reduction
benefits associated with the following social programs:
32 James Heckman, Instrumental Variables: A Study of Implicit Behavioral Assumptions
Used in Making Program Evaluations 32 J Human Resources 441 (1997). On its face, Lev-
itt's finding that prison population growth was substantially higher prior to the filing of
prison litigation than it was in states that had no such litigation may suggest that increased
crime can lead to increased incarceration, which then can generate prison litigation.
" Daniel Nagin, Crime Rates, Sanction Levels and Constraints on Prison Population, 12
L & Socy Rev 341 (1978); Robert Sampson, Crime in Cities: The Effects of Formal and
Informal Social Control, in Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Michael Tonry, eds, 8 Crime and Justice:
A Review of Research 271 (1986).
' For example, one might want to consider the Armed Forces a kind of social program.
After all, they do claim to provide discipline and teach valuable skills, which might have a
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a) preschool and early childhood education/counseling;
b) family-based therapy (directed at families with children who pose un-
usual discipline problems);
c) "treatment" programs for juvenile delinquents; and
•d) labor market interventions, designed to remedy lapses in prior educa-
tion and/or bolster job skills.3"
Table 2 summarizes the results from a number of these programs.36 Un-
fortunately, while some programs for preventing crime do seem promising,
most have been evaluated only in small-scale or pilot projects or over rela-
tively short periods of time. Many of the evaluation studies are subject to
various methodological problems. And many programs were not evaluated
using an economic methodology that allows one to calculate their costs and
benefits, which means that, even if they were "effective" -that is, if they
can be shown to have a meaningful effect on criminal behavior-it is often
unclear whether the effect is large enough to justify the cost of the program.
A. Early-Childhood and Family Interventions
1. Program Characteristics
Table 2 outlines the experience with four successful early childhood in-
tervention programs, as well as the disappointing Head Start program.37 The
crime-reducing effect. Should various prison-like institutions, ranging from halfway houses
to group therapy, be considered social programs, or are they more like incarceration? The
distinctions among these alternatives can at times be somewhat arbitrary.
" Note that there is considerable overlap among these technologies. For example, the Job
Corps not only teaches vocational skills, it also explicitly attempts to shape participants' val-
ues, stressing the importance of a "good attitude" in determining labor market success (Sar
Levitan and Frank Gallo, A Second Chance: Training for Jobs 123-55 (1988)). This begins
to look rather like some kind of therapy. Similarly, the preschool programs that successfully
influenced children's behavior also "taught" parenting skills to their families.
36 Caution is needed in drawing conclusions about the efficacy of a small number of suc-
cessful programs amid a large number of unsuccessful ones. Consider 100 programs, none
of which has an actual effect but whose performance is measured subject to random error.
By chance, we would expect to observe five programs that appear to work with a 95 percent
probability (assuming a one-tailed test). Selecting the most effective five would make it seem
as if we had identified some promising interventions, when in fact all we had done is identi-
fied five lucky draws. This fact suggests that follow-up studies should be performed in the
wake of encouraging findings and that particular attention should be paid to characteristics
that distinguish the successful from the unsuccessful programs. If such characteristics can
not be identified, our confidence in the allegedly successful programs should be lowered.
" For a more extensive literature review and analysis, on which we rely in the following
discussion, see Hirokazu Yoshikawa, Prevention as Cumulative Protection: Effects of Early
Family Support and Education on Chronic Delinquency and Its Risks, 115 Psychological
Bulletin 2854 (1994).
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successful programs share three characteristics. First, they begin their inter-
ventions with very young children-starting before birth in the case of the
Syracuse and Yale experiments, and in all cases before age 4.38 Unlike Head
Start, moreover, the successful projects involved the child's family in coun-
seling or therapy that accompanied the preschool or day care offered in the
program. Thus, the successful programs attempted not only to teach cogni-
tive and emotional development39 but also to buttress family relationships
by teaching basic child care skills and techniques for effective discipline,
working with both parents and children. Hirokazu Yoshikawa refers to this
as an "ecological" approach, emphasizing the totality of a child's life cir-
cumstances and the importance of interaction between family behavior
(such as how and when children are disciplined), the child's cognitive
skills, and his4" social environment.
Finally, the successful programs were small scale, high quality, and high
cost. Unlike Head Start-which enrolls about 700,000 preschool children a
year and has had millions of students over its 3-decade lifetime-the exper-
imental programs have total enrollments measured in the double or triple
digits. Again, unlike Head Start, the programs were staffed by large num-
bers of highly trained professionals, although many also made use of para-
professionals. 4 Higher teacher/student ratios, better-trained staff, longer
program length,42 and the addition of in-home counseling make the cost of
the Perry program, for instance, almost 2.5 times that of the typical Head
3' The importance of early life intervention is consistent with the results in Adrian Raine
et al, Birth Complications Combined with Early Maternal Rejection at Age 1 Year Predispose
to Violent Crime at Age 18 Years, 51 Archives General Psych 984, 988 (1994). This careful
longitudinal study concludes that boys who experienced medical complications at birth in
combination with weak maternal affection were substantially more likely to be involved in
violent crime by age 18.
'9 For an extended description of the Perry Preschool curriculum, see Mary Hohmann et
al, Young Children in Action: A Manual for Preschool Educators (The Cognitively Oriented
Preschool Curriculum) (1979). The schools varied in the extent to which they emphasized
different aspects of education.
4 Since males account for the vast majority of delinquency and crime, we will use the
masculine pronoun throughout.
4' By contrast, "70 percent of Head Start staff are from low-income families similar to
those from which its children come." Ron Haskins, Beyond Metaphor: The Efficacy of Early
Childhood Education, 44 Am Psychologist 274, 281 (1989). While this may be desirable in
terms of community involvement, it does not seem effective in producing significant im-
provements in the life chances of the children enrolled in the program.
42 The successful programs lasted for at least 2 years and, in some cases, considerably
longer. The first cohort in the Perry Preschool experiment may be an exception: these chil-
dren participated for only I year and apparently have done as well as those who had the-full
2-year program. John R. Berrueta-Clement et al, Changed Lives: The Effects of the Perry
Preschool Program on Youths through Age 19, at 90 (1985). However, the sample size was
so small as to cast some doubt on this finding.
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Start program. The Yale program was almost 4.5 times as costly as a typical
2-year spell in Head Start, and we estimate that the Syracuse program was
roughly seven times as expensive as 2 years in Head Start.
2. Outcomes
The successful experimental programs produced lasting gains in social-
ization (for example, getting along with classmates, fighting), school func-
tioning (attendance, need for special education, repeating a year of school),
self-esteem, and family functioning. Unfortunately, they did not seem to
produce lasting improvements in IQ or other measures of cognitive func-
tioning. As with Head Start, they did manage to achieve temporary gains
in cognitive ability, but in all cases these gains faded with time.
Of the preschool programs we have been able to discover, only the Perry
and Syracuse evaluations looked beyond general behavioral or attitudinal
indicia to examine effects on actual delinquency. Both found that preschool
significantly reduced involvement with juvenile justice authorities. By age
19, 40 percent fewer of the experimental group in the Perry project had
been arrested at least once; 50 percent fewer had been arrested more than
twice, and a far greater proportion of those arrested had been arrested for
minor crimes.43
The Syracuse results, while not as well documented, are similarly im-
pressive in magnitude.' The program appears to have lowered by more than
70 percent the proportion of children who had been processed by the county
probation department. Moreover, among those with probation records, the
program children committed markedly less-severe offenses and had sub-
stantially less-frequent contact with the juvenile authorities.
By contrast, the available evidence does not demonstrate any delinquency-
reduction effect for Head Start. As Ron Haskins notes in his survey of
the Head Start evaluation literature, only a single, unpublished study even
attempted to examine the long-term effects of Head Start on criminal be-
havior. That study found that participation in Head Start had no effect on
" These differences are based on juvenile justice system records, not on self-report data,
and are statistically significant.
" The Syracuse study seems also to have more serious problems with attrition and turn-
over than did the Perry project, which may raise questions about its apparent effectiveness.
For example, 25 percent of the experimentals and 31 percent of the controls quit during the
course of the experiment itself; an additional 21 percent of the remaining experimentals and
27 percent of the controls could not be located for the follow-up sample 9 years after the
program ended (J. Ronald Lally, Peter L. Mangione, and Alice S. Honig, The Syracuse Uni-
versity Family Development Research Program: Long Run Impact of an Early Intervention
with Low-Income Children and Their Families 15 (1987)).
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adolescent delinquency.45 Moreover, Haskins's survey reports that numer-
ous studies have found no evidence of long-term effects of Head Start on
intellectual performance or "socioemotional functioning" and virtually no
effect on measures of life success such as teen pregnancy, welfare participa-
tion, and employment.' In sum, there are substantial reasons for concern
about the investment value of Head Start, although it may well provide con-
sumption benefits to disadvantaged children.
B. Family Therapy
The Oregon Social Learning Center has had considerable success with
its version of parent-oriented behavior therapy (Parent Training Therapy, or
PTT) in reducing "aversive" behavior of even severely socially malad-
justed children. By teaching parents how to effectively discipline their chil-
dren-through the consistent use of nonviolent punishments for misbehav-
ior-the center staff have been able to document substantial improvements
in child behavior. Since these improvements have been demonstrated under
ideal experimental conditions (random-assignment, blind evaluation, pre-
post differences), albeit with relatively small samples, the studies seem
quite convincing.47
While the short-term effects of PTT described in Table 2 are impressive,
it is less clear whether PTT can actually influence behavior over the long
run48 and whether it can deter actual delinquent behavior (arrests, crimes
" Haskins (cited in note 41), citing M. S. McDonald and E. Monroe, A Follow-up Study
of the 1966 Head Start Program (unpublished manuscript, Rome, Ga., Public Schools, no
date).
4 Haskins, at 278 (cited in note 41). Haskins notes that there are two kinds of selection
effects that are potentially important and have been ignored in most studies of the program.
Program managers deliberately select the worst-off among those eligible for the program, so
comparisons between participants and those on the waiting list will tend to be biased against
Head Start. Parents also decide whether to enroll their child in Head Start, some other pre-
school program, or no preschool at all.
In a recent paper, Janet Currie and Duncan Thomas find significant, persistent effects of
Head Start participation on test scores for white and Hispanic children (though not for blacks)
and significant effects of participation on indicators of overall health (for example, height)
for blacks (though not for whites). Janet Currie and Duncan Thomas, Does Head Start Make
a Difference? 85 Am Econ Rev 341 (1995). They utilize a large sample and employ an ele-
gant procedure to correct for selection effects. These findings suggest that the vast array of
studies indicating the lack of value in Head Start may be unduly pessimistic.
41 Other kinds of therapy are surveyed in Alan E. Kazdin, Treatment of Antisocial Behav-
ior in Children: Current Status and Future Directions, 102 Psychological Bulletin 187, 191
(1987), which concludes that Parent Training Therapy is "one of the most promising treat-
ments for conduct disorders."
4 C. G. Baum and R. Forehand, Long Term Follow-Up Assessment of Parent Training by
Use of Multiple Outcome Measures, 12 Beh Therapy 643 (1981), demonstrates that improve-
ments in behavior can be sustained up to 4.5 years after the cessation of therapy.
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committed), as opposed to so-called aversive acts (such as hitting siblings
or being abusive to parents).49 Since the families undergoing PTT have chil-
dren with serious behavioral problems between 3 and 12 years old, who are
still mostly too young to be committing serious acts of delinquency, the
ability of PTT to reduce crime over an extended period in a broader, more
heterogeneous population remains an open question.
Nonetheless, if PTT does turn out to have a significant effect on delin-
quency, it would appear to be an extremely efficient means of crime preven-
tion-at $450 per child, it costs only a small fraction of the expense of the
intensive interventions (preschool plus family counseling) discussed earlier.
C. Therapeutic Interventions for High-Risk Adolescents
The Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP) could be described as an in-
tensive counseling program for low-income, ninth- to twelfth-grade stu-
dents.5" The program operated in five sites, each run by local affiliates of a
community-based organization. Participants were "guaranteed up to 250
hours of education [tutoring, help with homework], 250 hours of develop-
ment activities [life/family skills, college or job planning] and 250 hours of
service [community service projects, jobs] each full year from the ninth
grade through high school graduation for in-school youth, or any time for
youth who may have dropped out, transferred, or even left their original
neighborhoods. Students received an hourly stipend of $1.00. . . rising to
$1.33.... Staff also received bonus payments and incentives. ' 5 1
Each site initially consisted of 50 students, of whom half were randomly
assigned to participate in the experiment and half constituted the control
group. The participants were monitored by a full-time counselor who had
close, daily contact with all of them. The program cost $10,600 per partici-
pant.
While preventing delinquency was not the project's primary concern-
in fact, the benefits of reduced delinquency were not even included in the
9 Gerald R. Patterson and Mike Stoolmiller, The Relation of Changes in Parental Resis-
tance and Discipline Practices to Long Term Clinical Outcome (unpublished manuscript, Or-
egon Social Learning Center, 1995), suggest, obliquely, that PTT can be effective in the long
term at reducing actual juvenile delinquency. The authors show that a mother's discipline
style has a significant effect on the date of first arrest of her child; in other work, they demon-
strate that Prr can significantly influence maternal discipline style. The conclusion would
seem to be that, by altering discipline style, PTT can influence the onset of juvenile delin-
quency. But there is no direct evidence for this proposition.
o This section draws on Andrew Hahn, with Tom Leavitt and Paul Aaron, Evaluation of
the Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP): Did the Program Work? A Report on the Post-
secondary Outcomes and Cost-Effectiveness of the QOP Program (1989-1993) (Brandeis
University, Heller Graduate School, Center for Human Resources, 1994).
" Id at the summary.
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cost/benefit calculations-the evaluation did ask subjects whether they had
been in trouble with the police in the last year and, if so, how often.52 Pro-
gram participants appeared to have had fewer brushes with the police than
did the control group.
There are at least three reasons to be cautious in concluding that QOP
represents a useful technology for crime prevention, however. First, even
though half as many of the participants in QOP reported trouble with the
police as compared with the control group, the difference was only signifi-
cant at the 12 percent level by our calculations.53 Moreover, the significance
declines further if we include the data from the unsuccessful Milwaukee
site, which the analysts dropped from their evaluation.
Second, there were wide differences in the performance across sites,
which may suggest that idiosyncratic features were responsible for the suc-
cessful program(s). In fact, virtually all of the treatment effect is traceable
to the Philadelphia and Saginaw, Michigan, programs."4 San Antonio partic-
ipants actually had more trouble with the police than the control group, and
the Oklahoma City participant and control groups were essentially indistin-
guishable.
Finally, the delinquency data are based on self-reports, which do not
seem to have been checked against police or other records. It is at least
possible that the program influenced participants' willingness to admit that
they had trouble with the police, rather than changing their delinquent be-
havior per se. Since the evaluation makes much of the fact that the treat-
ment group had stronger community ties and more respect for authority,
either explanation seems plausible. While there are several studies confirm-
ing the validity of self-report data in general,55 one must be cautious in us-
2 The evaluation was conducted in the year after the subjects graduated (or would have
graduated) from high school, an age that would place them at a high risk for delinquency.
" The report presents a p-value of 9 percent, ostensibly using the same X2 test we did. We
are unable to explain the difference.
' Philadelphia was clearly the most successful site on virtually all outcome measures.
Newspaper accounts suggest that the counselor in Philadelphia was particularly dedicated and
energetic, which probably accounts for at least some of his unusual success. Celia Dugger,
Experiment with Success-a Special Report: Guiding Hand to College for Ghetto Youth, NY
Times 1 (March 9, 1995).
" See Robert Sampson, Sex Differences in Self-Reported Delinquency and Official Rec-
ords: A Multiple-Group Structural Modeling Approach, 1 J Quantitative Criminol 345
(1985); M. Erickson and W. B. Smith, On the Relation between Self-Reported and Actual
Deviance, 2 Humboldt J Soc Relations 106 (1974); J. A. Kulik, K. B. Stein, and T. R. Sarbin,
Disclosure of Delinquent Behavior under Conditions of Anonymity and Nonanonymity, 32 J
Consulting & Clinical Psych 506 (1968). For the view that there is a tendency in the general
population to underreport previous involvement in crime, see Travis Hirschi, M. J. Hinde-
lang, and J. G. Weiss, The Status of Self-Report Measures, in M. W. Klein and K. S. Teil-
mann, eds, Handbook of Criminal Justice Evaluation 473 (1980).
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ing such data in evaluating a program that could well have had an effect on
the willingness to report police encounters accurately.
In sum, while the QOP may have produced important changes in other
aspects of participants' lives, the evidence for a significant effect on delin-
quency is not compelling.
D. Labor Market Interventions
1. General Comments
A vast array of governmental or quasi-governmental programs have tried
to boost the labor market performance of young adults. These include Job
Search Assistance, the Summer Training and Education Program, the Job
Training Partnership Act, and so on.56 Unfortunately, the available evi-
dence, much of which is quite rigorous, suggests that-with one excep-
tion-these programs have had little or no effect on earnings, 7 employ-
ment,58 teen pregnancy,59 or participation in welfare.' Since the programs
were not specifically designed to reduce criminal behavior, and since they
had little or no effect on the variables they were designed to influence, it
seems unlikely that they would have a substantial effect in reducing crimi-
nal conduct.
Table 2 does examine one promising jobs program-the Job Corps-
which should thus be viewed against the backdrop of a series of largely
unsuccessful labor market interventions by the federal government, alone
or in partnership with private contractors. Although there is evidence that
the Job Corps does indeed reduce criminal behavior, its performance stands
out sharply from that of other programs designed to accomplish similar
ends.6' It is therefore useful to consider the aspects of the Job Corps that
differ from other less successful programs.
56 See James J. Heckman, Is Job Training Oversold? 115 Pub Interest 91 (Spring 1994);
and James J. Heckman, Rebecca Roselius, and Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Educational and Training
Policy: A Re-evaluation of the Underlying Assumptions behind the "New Consensus," in
Lewis C. Solomon and Alec R. Levenson, eds, Labor Markets, Employment Policy, and Job
Creation (Westview, 1994), for excellent summaries of the available evidence.
" The Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA) raised 18-month total earnings for adult
enrollees by roughly $900; earnings for youth fell by about $300 for women and $1,300 for
men. Heckman et al, at 41 (cited in note 56).
58 Heckman et al found only a 2-5 percent increase in employment rates for JTPA enroll-
ees compared with a control group.
" For example, the Summer Training and Education Program had no effect on high school
graduation rates, pregnancy, or welfare utilization. Heckman et al, at 25 (cited in note 56).
60 Id at 28.
61 See, for example, Statement to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee by
Robinson G. Hollister, Jr., regarding the Job Corps, 99th Cong, 1st Sess E3056 (June 26, 1985).
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2. The Job Corps
1. Background. The key feature of the Job Corps is that it is a residen-
tial, 6-7 month program. The participants, who are mostly high school
dropouts, are 70 percent male and 60 percent black; only 14 percent read
at above an eighth-grade level.6 2 While participants are economically disad-
vantaged and presumably have a high potential for criminality, the program
does not accept applicants with serious behavioral problems, so hard-core
delinquents tend to be excluded. Corps members are taught vocational skills
(secretarial, auto repair, and so on); they are also provided with substantial
remedial education.
The Job Corps has been subjected to a series of careful economic evalua-
tions, based on a matched sample design, with econometric controls for ob-
served and unobserved heterogeneity.63 The results of these cost-benefit cal-
culations suggest that the program generates social benefits (including
crime reduction) in excess of its social costs, with a rate of return of about
18 percent.' The program had a cost per enrollee of about $12,100 in 1993
dollars. The benefits consisted of reductions in murders, reductions in other
crimes, and gains in output by participants in the program; properly dis-
counted, these benefits totaled $17,600 per enrollee.65 In other words, the
primary study on the Job Corps, which was completed in 1982, concluded
that each dollar spent on the program returned $1.46.
2. Effects on Crime. Understanding the Job Corps' effects on crime is
not entirely straightforward, even given the massive amount of information
in the Final Report. Column 3 of Table 3 presents the Final Report's esti-
mate of the per capita annual reduction in certain crimes attributable to par-
ticipation in the Job Corps. The authors report that these numbers are all
statistically significant,66 but it is difficult to get a sense of their magnitude,
62 Levitan and Gallo, at 133 (cited in note 35).
63 David A. Long et a], Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of the Job Corps, 1 J Policy
Analysis & Mgmt 55 (1981); and Charles Mallar et al, Evaluation of the Economic Impact
of the Job Corps Program: Third Follow-Up Report (Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.,
1982) (hereafter, the Final Report).
Final Report, at 261 (cited in note 63).
6 Of the total benefits, roughly 40 percent came from reduction in crime of all kinds,
while the remaining 60 percent came largely from additional output produced by participants
in the program after graduation. If the increased output is ignored and the program is consid-
ered purely as a crime-reduction measure, its benefits are not large enough to cover its costs.
' As far as we can tell, the procedure employed in the evaluation seems to have been as
follows: (1) correct the reported number of arrests to account for underreporting; (2) estimate
an ordinary least squares regression using the corrected number of arrests as the dependent
variable; (3) include a number of demographic variables (age, sex, and so on) and a correc-
tion for sample selection effects as explanatory variables; and (4) also include a dummy vari-
able for participation in the Job Corps. The coefficient on this dummy is then the estimated
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATES OF THE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN ARRESTS PER PARTICIPANT
(TREATMENT EFFECT) FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE JOB CORPS
JOB CORPS
CONTROL GROUP Percentage
Number of Arrests Reduction in Reduction
Crimes per Number of Crime
Committed Crime* Arrestst in Arrests:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Murder N.A. N.A. .003 N.A.
Assault N.A. .175 .001 N.A.
Robbery .46 .062 .006 21.0
Burglary 4.65 .028 .005 3.8
Larceny and motor
vehicle theft 11.45 .023 .041 15.6
Weighted average 12.3
SOURCES.-Col. 1: Marvell and Moody (cited in note 26), table V, p. 132. Col. 2: Spelman (cited in
note 12), table 5.1, col. 4, p. 171. Col. 3: Mallar et al. (cited in note 63), table VII.6, p. 233.
NOTE.-N.A. = not available.
* The data come from surveys asking prisoners how many crimes they committed and how many times
they were arrested.
t The authors of the Job Corps study conclude that both corps members and controls understate their
actual arrests, so they inflated reported arrests by 1.7 to estimate actual arrests. The data in col. 2 are
arrests per crime and are thus compatible with these adjusted data.
t 100 X col. 3/(col. 1 X col. 2).
especially since the study does not present the actual number of arrests for
either the control or experimental group. Here, we try to estimate the crimi-
nality of the control group, so we can get a feel for the proportion by which
the Job Corps reduced crime.
We begin our analysis by estimating the baseline number of crimes com-
mitted by the control group (col. 1 of Table 3).67 We can then use estimates
of the probability of arrest per crime committed to ascertain the annual
number of arrests experienced by the control group.68 Multiplying the num-
program effect. We aggregated these effects across the sample periods (in-program, 1-year,
2-year, and so on), then annualized to arrive at a total effect.
67 We rely on Marvell and Moody's estimates of the amount of crime of various kinds
committed by the marginal addition to the U.S. prison population. Marvell and Moody, at
132, table 5 (cited in note 26). This group is presumably more prone to crime than the control
sample in the Job Corps study. Thus, when we use this number in computing the denominator
of the ratio of "crimes reduced by being in the Job Corps" to "crimes committed by the
control group," we tend to understate the effectiveness of the Job Corps in reducing crime.
6 Since the Job Corps study used self-reports of arrest, we used Spelman's comparable
data, which is drawn from RAND surveys of prisoners. The implicit assumption is that any
bias in the prisoner self-reports is of the same magnitude for both their number of arrests
and the number of crimes committed, so that the ratio of arrests/crime is unbiased.
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ber of crimes (col. 1) by the ratio of arrests/crime (col. 2) yields a baseline
estimate of the number of arrests the control group experienced. Column 4
then computes the estimated percentage reduction in arrests caused by par-
ticipation in the Job Corps.6 9
Because our estimates of the number of arrests experienced by the con-
trol group are likely to be biased upward-since Job Corps participants are
probably less criminal than the marginal prison entrant-we have probably
understated the effectiveness of the Job Corps. In contrast, the Job Corps
figures were based on self-reports of arrests, which we argued above is
problematic when evaluating programs that may alter the willingness to
admit to criminal conduct.7" Even when seen as lower bounds, however, the
results in column 4 look plausible. The Job Corps appears to reduce arrests
by roughly 20 percent for robbery, 15 percent for larceny and auto theft,
but by only 4 percent for burglary. The weighted average reduction is 12.3
percent.
3. Caveats. On its face, the Job Corps looks like a very attractive pro-
gram: an 18 percent rate of return on a social program is very unusual, and
it appears to generate some significant reductions in criminal conduct not
only during the period of residential living but in the subsequent 4-year pe-
riod as well. However, there are some reasons for caution. First, recent re-
ports by the Labor Department's inspector general may suggest that the pro-
gram's performance has slipped since the Job Corps was last evaluated in
1982, resulting in higher costs, more dropouts, and lower job placement
rates.7 Although we are skeptical about the inspector general's report,72 any
assessment of the Job Corps as it currently functions, or might function in
a future expanded form, should bear in mind that the program's operation
and its effectiveness under different general labor market conditions may
have changed in significant ways in the 15 years since the Final Report was
completed.73
9 These estimates are obtained by taking the estimated arrest reduction (col. 3) as the
numerator and dividing by the baseline number of arrests.
70 See text around note 55.
71 Job Training Program Outcomes (Report No. 12-92-004-03-370, U.S. Department of
Labor, Office of the Inspector General, February 11, 1992). See also Ruth Larson, Hearing
Eyes Job of Job Corps, Wash Times'A8 (August 10, 1994).
72 For example, the inspector general complained that only 12 percent of Job Corps partici-
pants "eventually find work that matches their job skills." See U.S. Department of Labor,
Office of the Inspector General (cited in note 71). But the proper way to evaluate the value
of the Job Corps is to compare those in the program with those in the control group. The 12
percent figure standing alone is quite meaningless-especially since the inspector general
was troubled if a Job Corps participant who was trained to do job X ended up with job Y
(which still could be a positive outcome).
" These changes could make the program less successful today if the deteriorating labor
market for low-skilled individuals renders such job training less useful, or they could make
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Second, the Final Report estimates that participation in the program re-
duced the murder arrest rate of Job Corps members by about 3 per 1,000
participants per year, measured over the 4.5-year program evaluation pe-
riod. While statistically significant, the effect of Job Corps participation on
murder arrests seems implausibly large. Translated into the usual metric for
murder rates, the estimated reduction is 290 fewer murder arrests per
100,000 participants.74
The Final Report does not reveal the actual murder rate for the control
group and Job Corps participants. But assume that Job Corps participants
were never arrested for murder-that is, participation reduced murder ar-
rests by 100 percent. A reduction of 290 murder arrests per 100,000 partici-
pants could only occur if the control group had an arrest rate for murder at
least this high, but this is more than four times greater than the murder rate
for black males aged 15-24. In other words, these numbers could be accu-
rate only if the control group had an implausibly high murder arrest rate
and the Job Corps completely eliminated murder arrests during the experi-
mental period. The latter prospect seems unlikely, though, since we have
estimated above that the reductions for other crimes were far less dramatic:
21 percent for robbery, 3.8 percent for burglary, and 15.6 percent for lar-
ceny and motor vehicle theft.
In addition, column 3 of Table 3 indicates that, while the Job Corps re-
sulted in three fewer murder arrests per 1,000 participants, it lowered aggra-
vated assault arrests by only one per 1,000 participants. This again suggests
that the reduction in murders attributed to participation in the Job Corps is
greatly overstated because, in general, aggravated assault arrests far exceed
murder arrests.75
Although the Job Corps evaluation seems to have overstated the pro-
gram's ability to reduce murders, there is at least one countervailing factor
to consider. In monetizing the gains from reduced murders, the authors of
the Final Report valued each human life saved at roughly $300,000 (in
1993 dollars), which is considerably lower than most other estimates. For
example, Mark Cohen76 uses a figure of $2.79 million (1993 dollars), and
the program more successful if the increases in juvenile crime lead to a greater possibility
of enjoying significant crime reduction benefits.
7' At the time of the Final Report (cited in note 63), the murder rate for the United States
as a whole was about 10/100,000, and the murder arrest rate was only slightly lower. During
the evaluation period covered in the Final Report, the murder rate for black males aged 15-
24, a good proxy for Job Corps participants, was about 70 per 100,000.
71 In 1992, the total estimated arrests for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter were
22,510; for aggravated assault, 507,210. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States 1992, annual report, at 217, table 29.
76 Mark Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to Victims,
22 L & Socy Rev 537 (1988).
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some estimates range as high as $5 million." Conceivably, the overstate-
ment in the estimated reduction in murders-the true number might well
be only one-fourth the estimated number-could be precisely offset by the
low estimate for the dollar value of murders prevented, which in turn might
be only one-fourth the true value. In contrast, the estimated value of life in
these cost-benefit estimates usually varies positively with the present value
of future earnings, and the earning of potential murder victims of Job Corps
participants might well be low relative to the population at large, thereby
justifying the low estimate used in the Final Report. The proper means of
valuing human lives in cost-benefit studies-which obviously raises intrac-
table philosophical and ethical questions-turns out to be central to many
criminal justice policy decisions.
IV. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INCARCERATION AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS
A. An Overview of the Trade-off
It is frequently noted that it costs more to house someone in prison for
1 year than it would to send them to Harvard College for the same length
of time. The statement is usually followed by an admonition to spend the
money up front on educating the potential criminals, making it unnecessary
to send them to prison down the road. This section explores the logic of
this policy prescription. In doing so, we immediately run up against two
central problems. The first is the one we have already been discussing: are
there programs that can actually reduce criminality? The second is the prob-
lem of targeting.78 Most crime is committed by only a small fraction of the
total population.79 If we knew that there were programs that actually re-
duced criminality, and we knew in advance who the potential criminals
7 Cohen's figure is derived from studies estimating a workers' willingness to pay for re-
ductions in the risk of death by accepting lower wages. Using the same approach, however,
the Environmental Protection Agency estimated the value of a life to be $4.8 million (in
evaluating the cost of cigarette smoking).
" The issue is related to, but broader than, the criminological debates about selective inca-
pacitation. See, for example, Peter Greenwood, Selective Incapacitation (1984). Greenwood ar-
gues that an efficient way of using prison to reduce crime would be to sentence the criminals
who commit the most crimes to the longest sentences. Moral considerations aside, the prob-
lem is largely one of identifying who the career criminals actually are. For an empirically and
theoretically convincing rebuttal to Greenwood's conclusions, see Spelman (cited in note 12).
7 For example, Marvin Wolfgang, Robert F. Figlio, and Torstein Sellin, Delinquency in
a Birth Cohort (1972), conclude that approximately 6 percent of all males born in Philadel-
phia in 1945 committed 52 percent of all offenses by males born in Philadelphia in that year.
In a second study looking at males born in Philadelphia in 1958, 7.5 percent of these males
committed 61 percent of all the delinquent acts of that birth cohort of males. Paul Tracy,
Marvin Wolfgang, and Robert Figlio, Delinquency Careers in Two Birth Cohorts 279-80
(1990).
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would turn out to be, we could target such individuals for participation in
these programs. But apart from the legal and moral questions this kind of
targeting raises, there is no reliable way of identifying who is likely to be-
come a serious criminal, and certainly no way to make accurate predictions
early enough to be useful in assigning 3-year-old children to preschool. The
result is that any money saved by reducing the number of people in prison
must necessarily be spread across a large pool of potential incarcerees,
which limits the amounts available to be spent on each recipient.
The question we explore is whether the social resources that will be ex-
pended a decade or more from now on incarcerating today's youngsters
could instead generate roughly comparable levels of crime prevention if
they were spent today on the most promising social programs. To focus our
inquiry, assume that the two choices we confront are (1) increase the prison
population by 50 percent over the level in December of 1993, which seems
to be the trend of current policy, or (2) maintain the December 1993 level
of incarceration and spend the present value of the saved social resources
on crime-reducing social programs.
Increasing the prison population by 50 percent would be expected to re-
duce crime by an amount equal to
ACrime = .5 X ii,
where TI is the elasticity of crime with respect to the prison population. The
value of ri is obviously crucial to this analysis, and, as we discussed earlier,
our view is that the elasticity probably falls in the range of .15-.20, but it
could be as low as .10 or as high as .30. Using the broadest range estimates,
crime will be about 5-15 percent higher under a constant incarceration rate
policy than it would be with a 50 percent higher incarceration rate, other
things being equal.
The question then becomes whether channeling the social costs avoided
by cutting the growth of the prison population into social spending can off-
set the 5-15 percent increase in crime generated by these cuts. If so, then
spending-the social savings from a lower prison population on preventa-
tive social programs-would seem to be a clearly superior policy.
B. Assessing the Costs
To begin to explore the choice between the punitive and preventive strat-
egies of crime control, it is useful to consider the trade-offs that society is
implicitly making. One possibility might be to spend money on education,
counseling, and treatment for youngsters from preschool through high
school; alternatively, we might choose to spend these same funds on impris-
oning a small but significant portion of these children several years down
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the road. The decision must be confronted for the new crop of 3.8 million
3-year-olds rather directly. We can try to control crime through social
spending over the next 15 years or by spending money on them later for
commitment to juvenile detention centers or incarceration in federal and
state prisons.
If we make some assumptions about the future levels of incarceration for
the current group of 3-year-olds, we can compute the present value of the
future costs of incarceration for this cohort. First assume that the society
wished to maintain the 1993 incarceration rate." This would imply that to-
day's 3.8 million 3-year-olds will spend a total of about 925,000 person-
years in prison8 and about 93,945 person-years committed to juvenile de-
tention facilities. 82
Table 4 reveals the present value of the future cost of incarcerating to-
day's 3-year-olds both in juvenile detention facilities and in prison where
the growth of prison population is restrained and where it is allowed to
grow by 50 percent.8 3 Choosing the no-growth policy implies that we could
80 In 1993 the prison population, then numbering 925,000, was rising rapidly.
8' How many different individuals from this age cohort would actually go to prison? Obvi-
ously, the answer depends on the average length of stay and the number of repeat visits to
prison. For example, if the average time spent in prison were 2 years with no return visits,
then we would be incarcerating 462,500 individuals from this cohort at some point in their
lives. Alternatively, if the average person to be incarcerated spent 20 years in prison (perhaps
over many spells), then the total number of individuals who would be imprisoned from this
cohort would be 46,250.
Although our estimate of the total cost of incarceration (which is based on the number of
bodies in prison, not their identities) does not depend on this issue, we speculate that between
125,000 and 200,000 of the 3.8 million in this cohort will spend some time in prison. This
estimate is based on the age distribution of the total U.S. state prison population in 1991:
21.9 percent of the prison population was under age 25, 24.2 percent were aged 25-29, 21.5
percent were aged 30-34, and 32.4 percent were 35 or older. U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook, table 6.69 (1992).
As we see below, the number of individuals who, under present policies, will spend time
in prison is relevant in assessing the feasibility of targeting of high-risk individuals for some
form of preventive treatment. On reasonable assumptions, as many as two-thirds of the
100,000 poorest black male 3-year-olds of today may end up in prison.
82 The figure in the text represents the total number of juveniles in public and private de-
tention facilities in 1989. Id at table 6.27. Table 6.14 of that publication reveals that the bulk
of these juveniles are aged 14-18.
83 These figures represent only the full cost of physical custody and lost legitimate earn-
ings of the incarcerated population-not the cost of apprehending and convicting this popula-
tion. Nor do they include the cost of supervising the large number of individuals on probation
and parole. In 1990, 2.5 million individuals were on probation, and just under one-half mil-
lion were on parole. Id at tables 6.1 and 6.2. Furthermore, the figures do not account for the
sizable jail population. In 1991, the average daily population of jails was 422,609. Id at table
6.31. (The costs of apprehending and convicting the prison population should be added in to
weigh the prevention/incarceration trade-off, if in fact fewer arrests and convictions occur
with the preventive strategy.)
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TABLE 4
THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE FUTURE INCARCERATION
COSTS OF THE CURRENT COHORT OF 3.8 MILLION
3-YEAR-OLDS (Billions)
DISCOUNT RATE (in $)
3 Percent 4.5 Percent
At 1993 rate of incarceration 16.0 11.1
At 50 percent higher rate of
incarceration 24.0 16.7
Difference 8.0 5.6
SOURCE.-Our calculations are as described in text, assuming that
the social cost of incarcerating a prisoner for a single year is $35,620.
now spend $5.6 to $8 billion on today's 3-year-olds (depending on the ap-
propriate discount rate).
Having ascertained that a 50 percent increase in future incarceration for
today's 3-year-olds would cost between $5.6 and $8 billion (in present dol-
lars) and that it would reduce crime by 5-15 percent, we are now in a posi-
tion to explore the costs and benefits of an alternative policy: stopping the
growth in incarceration and redirecting the $5.6-$8 billion toward crime
reduction programs such as preschool education or job training. Subsection
C below examines how much social spending we can purchase with the so-
cial resources saved by stopping the growth in incarceration. Subsection D
examines how much crime reduction we can expect from this amount of
social spending, and discusses the conditions that must exist in order to
achieve greater reductions in crime from social spending than from in-
creased incarceration: (1) specifically, we see that the moderate (as opposed
to high-end) estimates of the crime-reducing effect of incarceration are ac-
curate; (2) we can target the social spending resources to the highest risk
population; and (3) we can achieve from a widely implemented social pro-
gram about half the benefits in crime reduction that have been obtained in
small pilot projects. Subsections E and F address some practical and ethical
concerns about the likelihood and advisability of such targeting and about
the feasibility of securing such benefits from a major social intervention.
C. How Much Social Intervention Can Our Diverted Resources Buy?
Table 5 summarizes how far the resources saved from a 50 percent re-
duction in incarceration would go if used to fund different social programs
over the lifetime of the current crop of 3-year-olds. For example, these
saved resources could fund a Perry Preschool-type program for between
376,000 and 540,000 students, which is roughly 10-14 percent of all 3-
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TABLE 5
THE CRIME-REDUCING SOCIAL PROGRAMS WE COULD BUY BY KEEPING THE PRISON
POPULATION AT CURRENT LEVELS INSTEAD OF ALLOWING A 50 PERCENT INCREASE
OVER THE NEXT 15 YEARS, BY THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN WHO COULD BE
SERVED (Percent of Current Cohort of 3-Year-Olds in Parentheses)
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT COST SAVINGS FROM
REDUCED INCARCERATION
Optimistic,
Most Most and No
PROGRAM§ Pessimistic* Optimistict Head Start:
Parent Effectiveness
Training, at
$450/child 12.4 million 17.8 million 22.4 million
(326) (467) (590)
Head Start, at
$6,000/child 928,000 1.3 million Does not
(24.4) (35.0) apply
Job Corps, at
$12,100/participantl 696,000 1.2 million 1.5 million
(18.3) (32.2) (40.6)
Perry Preschool, at
14,800/child 376,000 540,000 682,000
(9.9) (14.2) (17.9)
Yale Program, at
$25,800/child 216,000 309,000 391,000
(5.7) (8.1) (10.3)
Syracuse Program, at
$42,100/child 132,000 190,000 239,000
(3.5) (5.0) (6.3)
NOTE.-See text for explanation of sources. Numbers have been rounded.
* Savings = $5.60 billion, or almost $1,500 for each of the 3.8 million 3-year-olds.
t Savings = $8.2 billion, or $2,200 for each 3-year-old.
t Savings = $10.3 billion; col. 2 + $3,000/child X 2 years X 350,000 children/year. This amounts
to $2,700 for each 3-year-old.
§ Cost data are in 1993 dollars; program expenditures have been discounted to net present value terms,
where appropriate.[1 Since the Job Corps is a program designed for 17-year-olds, not 3-year-olds, the savings from re-
duced incarceration do not need to be discounted. Thus, the same prison closures in 2008 will generate
a larger sum of money for spending on the Job Corps in 2008 than would be available for spending on
3-year-olds today. The net present value of the program's future costs depends on the interest rate as-
sumption: at 3 percent, the net present value of the program's cost is $8,000.
year-olds. Alternatively, the $5.6 to $8 billion would enable us to spend
roughly $940-$1,040 each year from age 3 through the end of high school
if we targeted the money to the 500,000 3-year-olds currently supported by
AFDC. The available sum per year would be about 30 percent higher if we
limited it to the 350,000 3-year-olds currently enrolled in Head Start. These
are not trivial amounts, but they are unlikely to generate substantial school-
ing gains or crime reduction. Except for the low-cost Parent Training Ther-
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apy, the programs listed in Table 5 are too expensive to provide to the en-
tire cohort of 3-year-olds. Nonetheless, the message of the table is basically
encouraging because the savings from the reduction in incarceration are
sufficiently great that they could fund some promising social programs at a
relatively large scale.
Even if we make the most pessimistic assumptions about how much cut-
ting the prison population would reduce social costs, this sum would be
sizeable enough to pay for 2 years of Head Start for an additional 928,000
children. This would expand the Head Start program to roughly 1.3 million
3-year-olds-about one-third of the entire cohort. Since Head Start has
'shown no ability to reduce crime or delinquency (nor has it given strong
indication of long-term cognitive or social benefits), this would not be a
wise expenditure by our criteria. In fact, it might make sense to abolish
Head Start altogether and use the money to fund a super-Head Start type
program for a smaller number of children. We consider this option in the
last column of the table. Obviously, the more expensive and effective Perry
and Yale programs have more limited potential scope, reaching only 18 per-
cent (Perry) or 10 percent (Yale) of the 3-year-olds, even under the most
optimistic assumptions. But remember the finding that about 6 percent of
boys commit more than half the crime for boys of that age. As long as we
are treating a significant enough portion of the high-risk population so that
we are likely to capture a high proportion of that 6 percent, there is still
scope for a significant reduction in crime.
The advantage of the Job Corps as a crime-fighting vehicle comes from
the fact that it is a program for those aged 16-21. This implies that one
may be better able to target its use to those who are most at risk to commit
crime; moreover, expenditure on the Job Corps comes 13-18 years later
than expenditures on preschool interventions, which lowers the present
value of its cost. At present, the Job Corps currently enrolls about 60,000
people in 100 Job Corps centers located in 46 states.' The additional re-
sources that would be available from the reduction in incarceration, even
under pessimistic assumptions, would enable this enrollment to increase by
more than 10-fold, reaching about 18 percent of the cohort.
D. Effects on Crime
1. Targeting Young Males
We have just calculated how many individuals we could afford to enroll
in the various types of social programs with the savings from reduced incar-
Larson (cited in note 71).
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ceration. But how much crime reduction could we then expect to see from
the different social programs? For example, the Perry Preschool program
seems to have produced a 40 percent reduction in crime for those who par-
ticipated in it, and we could afford to provide this program for 10-18 per-
cent of all 3-year-olds. 5 It is unrealistic to think that the small Perry
Preschool program results could be replicated in such a massive social pro-
gram, but our working hypothesis will be that the massive preschool inter-
vention could reduce crime for its participants by half the amount found in
the Perry program, or 20 percent.
Could the program be targeted with sufficient precision to encompass all
those 3-year-old children who were destined to become the most active 6
percent of delinquents? If so, a 20 percent reduction in the crimes commit-
ted by this small group alone would reduce the cohort's overall crime by
10 percent (since these individuals commit 50 percent of all crime, and the
program is assumed to reduce the number of crimes they commit by 20
percent). In other words, if we could identify and treat the worst 6 percent
of delinquents and reduce their crime rate by 20 percent, our thought exper-
iment of shifting resources from imprisonment to social programs would
likely reduce crime or maintain it at the same level (unless the high-end
estimate of .3 as the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration were
true, in which case the reduced incarceration would elevate crime by 15
percent, and the social spending would lead it to fall by only 10 percent).
As a matter of algebra, crime reduction will be achieved most effi-
ciently-all other things being equal-if society pursues policies that change
the criminal behavior of the highest crime group. To increase the chance
that we treat the most crime-prone 6 percent, one might take cognizance of
the fact that almost 93 percent of those in prison are men.86 If one assumes
" Even if this finding is correct and reproducible on a large scale-empirical issues that
can only be answered in expanded pilot programs-we could only expect a 40 percent reduc-
tion in criminality if the enrollment in the expanded program were similar in potential crimi-
nality to those enrolled in the Perry Preschool. This point is developed with great sophistica-
tion (along with statistical adjustments to correct for these kinds of selection problems when
estimating large-scale effectiveness) by James Heckman, Randomization and Social Policy,
in Charles F. Manski and Irwin Garfinkel, eds, Evaluating Welfare and Training Programs
(1992).
Even if the larger population contains a larger proportion of noncriminals, it is conceivable
that the potential criminals in this population might be more amenable to treatment than those
in the original experimental population. This would partially offset the problem discussed in
the previous paragraph.
86 In 1990, 92.6 percent of state and federal prison inmates were men. U.S. Department
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, table 6.65 (cited in note 81).
That we want to change male criminal conduct does not necessarily imply that we should
focus our spending on men, however, for two reasons. First, it might be easier to influence
male behavior by changing parenting practices than by spending directed explicitly at young
boys themselves. Second, the participation of young girls in, for example, the Perry Program
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that the rate of incarceration coincides with the rate of serious, violent
crime, then this crime rate for men is 13.3 times the crime rate for women.
87
By limiting our spending on an enriched preschool program for boys, we
could afford to offer a Perry Preschool program to almost 20 percent (pre-
sumably the worst-off 20 percent) of all boys, even under the most pessi-
mistic assumptions. Under the most favorable projections, we could provide
a Perry-like program for the poorest one-fourth of all children or the poorest
half of all boys. The more expensive Yale and Syracuse programs would
be available to a commensurately smaller group of potential enrollees.
2. Further Targeting: Young Black Males
If we assume that black men, who make up 45 percent of those in prison,
commit 45 percent of the serious, violent crime, then black men have a
crime rate that is 12.8 times that of the remaining 94 percent of the popula-
tion.88 Thus, even with as crude a strategy as targeting all expenditures on
3-year-old black boys, we can ensure that our expenditures will reach those
with an expected future crime rate that is roughly 12.8 times that of the
base population.
Returning to Table 5, we note that the savings from our hypothetical 50
percent reduction in incarceration is sufficient to enroll virtually all of the
295,000 3-year-old black boys in any of the social programs listed, even
under the most pessimistic assumptions.89
3. The Crime-Reduction Benefits of Selected Social Programs
Table 6 compares the crime-reduction benefits from the various programs
under different assumptions about how much money is available to be spent
might contribute in some important way to its success in altering the behavior of its male
participants. Perhaps having girls as role models would be useful in teaching boys how to
behave. The bottom line is that program cost doubles if one must provide benefits to both
boys and girls, and therefore, one must explore whether crime reduction benefits also double
if both boys and girls are funded.
87 Given the assumption in the text, the following condition must hold:
.5pycl(.5pyc + .5pc) = .93,
where p is the total population, c is the crime rate for the 50 percent of the population that
is female, and yc represents the crime rate of the 50 percent of the population that is male.
Solving for y reveals that the crime rate for men is 13.3 times that of women.
88 If black men are 6 percent of the population, then .06pycl(.O6pyc + .94pc) = .45, where
p is the total population, c is the crime rate for the 94 percent of the population that is neither
black nor male (the base population), and yc represents the crime rate of black males. The
value of y = 12.8.
89 The sole exception is the Syracuse program, which we estimate is so expensive that it
could only be made available to about 44 percent of the 295,000 3-year-old black boys under
pessimistic assumptions. Under more optimistic assumptions, 80 percent coverage for this
group would become feasible, however.
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TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE REDUCTION IN THE Total VOLUME OF CRIME
HYPOTHETICALLY ACHIEVABLE WHEN SAVINGS FROM REDUCED




PROGRAM Worst Case* Best Caset
Job Corps: f
From black males 2.8 5.5
From others served .4§ 2.511
Total reduction in crime 3.2 8.0
Perry Preschool:#
From black males 9.00 18.0
From others served .3** 2.5tt
Total reduction in crime 9.3 20.5
Syracuse Program:ft
From black males 7.1 26.1
From others served .0§§ .01111
Total reduction in crime 7.1 26.1
SOURCES.-Calculations are based on Table 5 and text.
* Cost savings are from cutting prison population = $5.6 billion. Program
is one-half as effective in large scale as in original experiment.
t Cost savings of $10.3 billion. Program is equally effective in large scale
as in original application.
t 12.3 percent reduction in crime in original experiment.
§ In addition to the 295,000 black males, the program could also serve
400,000 others, who account for 5.8 percent of all crime.
11 In addition to the 295,000 black males, the program could also serve 1.2
million others, who account for 18 percent of all crime.
# 40 percent reduction in crime for participants in original program.
** In addition to the 295,000 black males, the program could also serve
81,000 others, who account for 1.2 percent of all crime.
tt In addition to the 295,000 black males, the program could also serve
387,000 others, who account for 5.6 percent of all crime.
1$ 70 percent reduction in crime for original participants.
§§ The program can only be offered to 46 percent of the 295,000 black
males.I11 The program can only be offered to 80 percent of the 295,000 black
males.
and how effective the programs are at reducing the criminal behavior of
those who participate. In many instances, there are sufficient funds avail-
able to pay for the program for some of the 3-year-olds outside the crude
target group of 295,000 black males. The table thus decomposes the total
crime reduction into that caused by the changed behavior of black males
and of the other recipients.
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Consider the Job Corps, which we estimated reduced crime among pro-
gram participants by 12 percent in the past. Because the program is less
expensive and is implemented further in the future, we could afford to en-
roll all blacks from the current cohort of 3-year-olds, with enough left over
to pay for more than 400,000 others, even under the pessimistic assump-
tions about the magnitude of the available resources. If we again assume
that the program would reduce crime for all participants by half of its esti-
mated 12 percent, it would then generate a 2.77 percent (.45 X .12 X .5)
reduction in the overall level of crime from the black males who partici-
pated and an additional .4 percent reduction from the others who could be
enrolled. Under these assumptions, an expanded Job Corps could not lower
crime as much as the alternative policy of a 50 percent increase in the level
of incarceration. Even under the most highly optimistic assumptions listed
in Table 6, the Job Corps is less effective than the Perry Preschool-type
intervention at reducing crime in a cost-effective manner.9'
On its face, widespread adoption of the Perry Preschool program looks
most promising, in large part because the initial program was deemed to
have reduced crime by 40 percent. The Syracuse program is the most ex-
pensive of the three considered in the table. It also appears to be the most
effective at reducing crime, although problems in the evaluation may call
this finding into question.9' Under the most pessimistic assumptions, the
program falls slightly short of our target 7.5 percent crime reduction stan-
dard. Under more optimistic assumptions, the program reduces overall
crime rates by a dramatic 26 percent. Even though the program is relatively
expensive, we could afford to enroll all of the 295,000 3-year-old black
males who, it is posited, will commit 45 percent of the FBI index crime for
that cohort. Assuming that a broad-based program could reduce crime
among program participants by only 20 percent (that is, at half the rate of
the original Perry program), the overall reduction in crime would be 9.3
percent-even under pessimistic assumptions about resource availability. In
sum, halting the growth of the prison population and shifting the resources
to a Perry Preschool-type program that was only one-half as effective at
reducing crime as the original Perry Preschool could still reduce crime
9 Note that the optimistic Job Corps estimates would only be generated if one could ob-
tain the full 12 percent crime reduction from the full array of participants, who would then
include 1.2 million nonblack males (see Tables 5 and 6). But it is questionable whether
applying the Job Corps so broadly to a class of participants likely to be far different from
those examined in the 1982 Job Corps assessment would generate the same amount of crime
reduction.
" See note 44 above.
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while realizing a social savings-if the low or moderate levels of the pre-
dicted effectiveness of incarceration are most accurate.92
One cautionary note. Given the uncertainties surrounding the calculations
and assumptions we have made, the numbers in Tables 5 and 6 cannot be
accepted as precisely measured. But the thrust of our demonstration is com-
pelling in that it clarifies the assumptions necessary for increased spending
on social programs to generate crime reductions of the same order of mag-
nitude as the prison spending it replaces. Moreover, the case for at least
further experimentation on social programs is strengthened, we think, when
we consider some additional consequences of the prevention approach.
E. Prevention versus Incarceration: Some Additional Consequences
1. Ancillary Benefits
The above analysis has ignored a number of social costs and benefits
from the two different approaches-prevention expenditures versus incar-
ceration expenditures. First, the prevention expenditures that we have con-
sidered generated significant benefits in addition to those stemming from
crime reduction. Indeed, none of the successful programs were specifically
designed as anticrime policy. Our focus on trade-offs between incarceration
and social programs that leave the crime rate unchanged is thus a very con-
servative way of evaluating these social programs. At least some of these
programs have positive net benefits evaluated on their own merits. These
include better school performance for program participants, greater produc-
tivity, and greater psychological well-being for the treated individuals and
their families.
Similarly, prison is likely to lower future productivity and increase psy-
chological problems for the incarcerated individuals and their families. If
the skeletal costs and benefits of the two approaches were roughly compara-
ble, it would seem that these factors would tip the balance decidedly in fa-
vor of preventive expenditures.
I The increase in crime from the curtailed growth in incarceration was already estimated
to be about 5-15 percent. Table 6 reveals that the offsetting estimated reduction in crime
from the preschool intervention would be at least 9 percent.
The aggregate crime reduction from social programs could be overstated to the extent that
the replacement effect (discussed earlier with respect to incarceration) also operates when
potential criminals turn away from crime. But note that, while perhaps 50,000 of the 3.8
million cohort of 3-year-olds will be incapacitated by incarceration during the cohort's peak
period of criminality, at least 385,000 and possibly as many as 980,000 3-year-olds will re-
ceive the preschool intervention. Thus, the replacement phenomenon should have less scope
to operate in the case of effective social interventions.
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2. Practical and Ethical Issues in Selection
The selection of children for participation in these programs raises some
difficult moral and practical issues. It is not costless to select individuals
either for preventive treatment or for incarceration, but the costs of the two
approaches are different in kind and difficult to compare.93 Any program
that tried to give preschool enrichment to a narrow group targeted on race
and gender grounds would be controversial and possibly unconstitutional.
Why should girls be excluded from a program that can produce a substan-
tial improvement in life chances simply because they tend to commit less
crime than boys? What about poor Hispanics? Poor whites?
Another serious concern is that a focus-whether explicit or implicit-
on "treating" certain demographic groups may stigmatize them as inher-
ently crime-prone, with adverse consequences. For example, the National
Institutes of Health is currently conducting a violence prevention project
involving more than 8,600 children in 16 Chicago area schools. The parents
of children who are enrolled in the program are told that the children have
been selected for "leadership training." One of the principal investigators
in the project admitted the deception in that "we don't say to people that
the real reason we're funded is because we believe these kids are at high
risk for antisocial behavior."'
Selection raises practical concerns as well. Selection on gender grounds
is especially difficult since one cannot rely on geographical segregation to
screen out young girls or women, as might be possible for selection on
other grounds. Moreover, since all of the preschool programs we discuss
were implemented coeducationally, a plan to treat only boys would presum-
ably alter the character of the programs, perhaps in a way that might impair
their effectiveness. For example, teaching young boys to cooperate with or
respect young girls might be an important component in some of the pro-
grams we described, and this component might be undermined if enrollment
were restricted to boys only. It is at least conceivable, however, that even
" Even though there is a sense in which criminals "select themselves" into incarceration,
there are still significant selection costs involved, albeit no fear of moral hazard. The police
must catch and the criminal justice system must prosecute and convict criminals before they
can be incarcerated. These expenses need not be factored in to the costs of incarceration,
however, if changes in the incarceration rate come purely from reductions in the likelihood
of incarceration conditional on arrest and conviction.
4 Sheryl Stolberg, Nipping Violence in the Bud, LA Times Al (December 31, 1993). One
might argue that the current criminal justice system, which imprisons black males at nearly
eight times their share of the total population, is also imposing some significant stigma costs.
But to some there may be important symbolic differences between treating people as crimi-
nals after they have committed a crime and treating them as potential criminals before they
have actually done anything.
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though young men commit the vast majority of violent crimes, the best way
to reduce their criminality could nevertheless be by reaching their wives/
girlfriends/mothers.
For these reasons, we do not take our analysis as a call for targeting ben-
efits on race or gender grounds but, rather, merely as a demonstration of
the conditions under which spending on certain enriched social programs
can generate substantial crime-reduction benefits at no greater social cost
than the incarceration policy it would supplant. If we know that crude race
and gender targeting could meet our crime-reduction goals, then a more so-
phisticated targeting system (assuming the constitutional impediments can
be overcome) would provide even greater benefits at lower costs. Many of
the concerns about actual program implementation have not been problem-
atic for programs such as the Job Corps, which predominantly serves inner-
city black males, but without explicitly targeting any demographic group.
Once a sophisticated targeting strategy is developed, it may be possible to
design the program in a way that the parents or guardians of those most at
risk for future criminality will disproportionately seek to participate. Since
the successful programs we describe were not specifically designed as
anticrime measures, it should presumably be possible to avoid attaching this
label to them, which would help to avoid some of the stigma problems dis-
cussed earlier.9"
3. Public Choice Aspects of Crime Policy
Finally, we must note that the strategy we have outlined might be politi-
cally difficult to implement. Doubtless, there are reasons why American so-
ciety seems so committed to the incarcerative approach. Our proposal to
shift resources away from further prison building to social spending would
provide educational, emotional, and psychological gains and lower crime
rates for program participants and their families and communities, who are
likely to be members of politically disadvantaged groups. At the same time,
even though the combination of more social spending and less incarceration
would not increase crime overall, it might increase crime somewhat in the
more politically influential and affluent communities. The reason is that the
curtailed increase in the expected penalty for criminals would in itself tend
to increase crime everywhere, but this increase would be offset by crime-
reducing social programs that would likely most benefit poor communi-
ties. Although the overall social costs and benefits of this policy might be
11 We might be able to finesse some of the selection problems by basing entry into the
programs on race/gender-neutral characteristics such as income or distressed family charac-
teristics (for example, single parenthood).
PRISONS AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS
appealing-that is, it might be both efficient and equality-enhancing-it
might not be distributionally palatable since the high-payoff, targeted-
prevention strategy advantages groups who are numerical minorities with
relatively low political power at the expense of those with greater numbers
and more clout. Moreover, preschool programs impose costs today and
yield benefits in 15-20 years, which is not an appealing formula for most
politicians. Thus, shifting resources from incarceration to social programs
may not be a politically sustainable policy.
V. CONCLUSION: SOME CAUTIONS-SCALE AND OTHER EFFECTS
As noted earlier, most of the successful experimental interventions we
discussed (with the exception of the Job Corps) were conducted on ex-
tremely limited scales, typically with fewer than 100 participants. Our
thought experiment involves massive increases in these programs, rather
than the marginal adjustments that make policy analysts feel most comfort-
able.
Expanding these social programs by many orders of magnitude will not
be straightforward, for a number of reasons. Costs will presumably rise as
we move up the supply curve for the kinds of high-quality teachers and
other personnel needed to staff these programs. The team spirit and morale
that seem to have been so important in the success of the small projects are
likely to be eroded in the larger, more bureaucratic organizations that will
be necessary to run nationwide programs. (Indeed, to some degree, this is
the message of Head Start. Because the Perry Preschool looked promising,
Congress massively increased spending on the far less expensive and less
valuable Head Start program.) Differences between the original experimen-
tal samples and the broader populations to be served may reduce the effects
of the treatments. Some of the experiments were conducted as long as 30
years ago; social conditions have undoubtedly changed during the past 3
decades, perhaps in a way that would make the programs less effective than
they originally were, even for an otherwise similar population of children.
For all these reasons, therefore, the hypothetical calculations we have
presented should not be read to suggest that immediate, large-scale imple-
mentation of any of the programs is desirable. Rather, our point is simply
that there may be scope for welfare-increasing large-scale interventions and
that society should begin the process of trying to see whether such interven-
tions can actually be carried out on a meaningful scale, rather than unthink-
ingly committing itself to a policy of massive prison construction without
a full awareness of all of its attendant financial and human costs.

